Bangladesh is approaching an election that many people have waited years to see, a vote that feels real, competitive, and full of possibility. But the same election season is also bringing back an old dread that sits deep in the national memory: political violence.
In a recent on the ground report, Al Jazeera describes a mood that swings between excitement and fear. Activists are campaigning again, voters are talking again, posters and rallies are back again. Yet, in the weeks since the election timetable was announced, a series of killings, threats, and street clashes has reminded Bangladeshis how quickly political competition can turn brutal.
This blog post is based on that reporting and uses it as a starting point to look at what is happening, why it keeps happening, and what a safer election could realistically look like.
Bangladesh Is Voting After A Political Earthquake
To understand why this election carries so much emotional weight, you have to start with the shock of the last two years.
Bangladesh is heading to parliamentary elections scheduled for February 12, 2026, the first national vote since the mass uprising of 2024 that ended the long rule of Sheikh Hasina. According to Al Jazeera, Hasina fled to India on August 5, 2024, and an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took charge with promises of a freer, fairer political process.
For many voters, that moment created a rare feeling that something truly new might be possible. Not just a change of faces, but a change in the rules of the game.
This is not just an election about who forms the next government. It is also tied to a wider argument about reforms and the structure of power itself. Al Jazeera notes that the interim government is overseeing a vote that coincides with a referendum on state reforms, with roughly 120 million eligible voters in a country of about 170 million people.
The Associated Press similarly reports that the election will include a referendum on a national charter that the interim government says would create more checks and balances and reduce the risk of authoritarian rule, including proposals like term limits and anti corruption measures.
And yet, while the election is being framed as a fresh start, the campaign is unfolding in a political landscape that remains deeply polarised.
Al Jazeera reports that the Awami League is absent after the interim administration banned its political activities in May 2025. That absence reshapes the contest and raises the stakes for parties that are trying to expand influence quickly, often by showing strength on the streets as much as at the ballot box.
So the national mood is split. There is hope because competition is back. There is fear because the muscle memory of violence is back too.
The New Wave Of Killings And Clashes
Nothing communicates the danger of a political season faster than the sense that campaigning can get you killed.
Al Jazeera opens with the story of a BNP student wing organiser in Dhaka reacting to the shooting death of a fellow activist, Azizur Rahman Musabbir, on January 7. The reporting captures a chilling reality for organisers: even when police say a killing is not political, fear spreads anyway, because people know how election seasons can work in Bangladesh.
From there, the article lays out a pattern that is hard to ignore.
Al Jazeera reports that Hasan Mollah, a local BNP leader near Dhaka, was shot on January 23 and died the next day. It also states that Mollah was the 16th political activist killed since the Election Commission announced the schedule on December 11.
The violence is not described as isolated to one party. Al Jazeera notes the killing of a Jamaat ward level leader, Anwarullah, and the earlier case of Sharif Osman Hadi, a youth leader connected to the 2024 protests who was shot on December 12 and later died on December 18 in a Singapore hospital.
A key detail in the reporting is the official ambiguity. None of these deaths, Al Jazeera says, has been formally classified as politically motivated. But for activists, the classification does not matter much because the effect is the same: intimidation, silence, and a shrinking space for open organising.
The article also points to the mechanics of violence, not just the headlines.
One reason election seasons become lethal is the availability of weapons. Al Jazeera cites government data stating that 3,619 weapons were looted from security forces during the 2024 uprising and that about 1,360 remained unaccounted for, even after recoveries before the polls.
Alongside targeted killings, there are repeated clashes. Al Jazeera cites a Human Rights Support Society report that recorded at least 62 election related clashes nationwide since the schedule announcement.
The point is not only that violence exists, but that it is happening early, repeatedly, and across locations, which creates a sense that election day is a looming storm rather than a civic celebration.
And this is where the fear becomes personal for ordinary voters.
Al Jazeera quotes a resident near a clash site in Dhaka’s Mirpur area saying the situation feels frightening and that people just want to vote peacefully. Even when you strip away party slogans, that desire is simple and universal: no one wants to risk injury just to cast a ballot.
Why Election Violence Keeps Returning
Bangladesh is not unique in facing election violence, but it has a particularly stubborn history of it. The tragedy is that many Bangladeshis hoped they had finally moved beyond the worst cycles, especially after the upheaval of 2024.
Al Jazeera points out that Bangladesh has routinely grappled with election season violence since independence in 1971. The report references data from the Bangladesh Peace Observatory, an initiative linked to the Dhaka based Centre for Alternatives, which mapped election period deaths across different cycles.
Those numbers matter because they show something important. Violence is not constant. It rises and falls depending on the political context.
Al Jazeera reports that the mapping recorded 49 deaths around the 1991 election, 21 around the 2008 vote, and 142 around the 2014 polls, a vote boycotted by major opposition forces. It also notes that the 2018 and 2023 elections under Hasina were widely described by rights groups and opposition parties as one sided, yet violence persisted.
The political lesson is uncomfortable but clear: even when competition is limited, violence can still be used to control territory, intimidate rivals, and send signals to communities.
For global context, the UN has previously warned about Bangladesh election violence. In a 2018 press release, UN human rights experts said they were alarmed by political violence and restrictions ahead of elections that year.
Al Jazeera also cites UN documentation from 2018, noting that UN experts recorded 47 incidents of election related violence in four days with eight deaths and more than 560 injured.
So why does it keep returning, even after a political reset?
Because violence is not only about ideology. It is often about control of local networks: who collects donations, who controls contracts, who dominates neighbourhood committees, who can mobilise crowds at short notice. In that kind of system, an election is not merely a vote. It is a struggle over influence.
And when parties believe the state will not punish violence consistently, the incentives get worse. Everyone feels they must either strike first or show they cannot be pushed around.
This is why the most dangerous phrase in politics is not “we will win.” It is “we cannot afford to lose.”
Rival Parties Rebel Candidates And Local Power Struggles
One of the strongest parts of Al Jazeera’s reporting is that it does not treat violence as only party vs party. It also looks at what happens inside parties.
First, the national lineup.
Al Jazeera reports that across Bangladesh’s 300 constituencies, the BNP is leading a coalition of 10 parties, while Jamaat e Islami is heading a separate 11 party alliance that includes the National Citizen Party, formed by students who led the anti Hasina movement. It also notes that other groups are contesting independently and that the Awami League is absent after being banned.
The Associated Press similarly reports that Jamaat e Islami and the student formed NCP are attempting to expand influence, while the BNP under Tarique Rahman is seen as a leading contender, and it highlights concerns about law and order during the campaign.
Now the local reality.
Al Jazeera describes a case in Tangail where a BNP student wing leader reported threats from a senior party figure aligned with a rival candidate. The details matter because they show how violence can be used as a tool of internal discipline. If your party has rebel candidates and competing patronage networks, intimidation becomes a way to clear the field.
The report also notes that, according to Prothom Alo, 92 BNP leaders were running as rebel candidates across 79 constituencies, and that analysts believe constituencies with rebel contenders are more prone to violence.
Then there is the street level rivalry between camps.
Al Jazeera recounts a clash in Mirpur on January 20 that injured about a dozen people and triggered fear among local residents, with BNP and Jamaat leaders accusing each other of intimidation and criticising the Election Commission’s response.
A crucial point here is that both sides can feel like victims at the same time. Each camp can tell itself it is acting defensively. That is how escalation happens.
And there is another accelerant: information warfare.
Al Jazeera includes allegations from BNP figures that online disinformation is feeding offline tension, while Jamaat figures argue their activists are being obstructed and intimidated. In modern campaigning, a rumour can travel faster than police can respond, and a local argument can become a national outrage in hours.
So when people ask, “Who is behind the violence?” the most honest answer is often: multiple actors, multiple motives, and a political culture that still rewards intimidation.
Security Forces Voter Fear And The Challenge Of A Peaceful Vote
Every election season produces promises of security. The real question is whether those promises feel believable to the people who have to walk into polling stations.
Al Jazeera reports that police officials say confrontations are becoming harder to prevent because political activity has expanded and ordinary people are more involved. A police officer in the north is quoted describing elections as feeling like a festival again, but also saying police cannot be everywhere at once.
That line captures the core dilemma.
A competitive election is louder, more emotional, and more crowded. It is also harder to police.
In response, Bangladesh is planning a massive security deployment. Al Jazeera reports that about 900,000 personnel, including 108,730 military members, will be deployed from February 8 to 14 to ensure security. It also states that more than half of the country’s 42,761 polling centres have been classified as risky and will receive the bulk of additional forces.
On paper, those numbers sound like control. On the ground, they can also raise a different fear: that heavy security becomes another form of intimidation, or that authorities will be blamed for bias no matter what they do.
The interim administration is trying to balance that perception. Al Jazeera reports that police leaders insist investigations will treat incidents as criminal acts regardless of affiliation, and that the Election Commission has promised robust measures for a peaceful vote.
But watchdogs remain concerned about credibility. Al Jazeera quotes Badiul Alam Majumdar of SHUJAN warning that rising intolerance could undermine the process and questioning whether assurances can overcome fear rooted in both the present and the past.
That final phrase is everything.
Fear in Bangladesh is not only about today’s clashes. It is about accumulated memory. People remember elections where polling day turned into mourning, where results felt predetermined, where violence was used as a message.
And if you widen the lens further back, human rights organisations had raised alarms in previous cycles about crackdowns, arrests, and excessive force connected to election politics. For example, Human Rights Watch documented concerns ahead of Bangladesh’s January 2024 election about widespread arrests and alleged abuses amid election related violence.
That history means the public does not simply listen to promises. The public looks for proof.
Proof looks like arrests that are transparent, investigations that actually conclude, and parties that face consequences when their activists cross the line.
What Hope Looks Like For Bangladesh In 2026
It is easy to write about Bangladesh elections in a tone of doom. But that would miss something real.
Even Al Jazeera’s reporting, despite its focus on killings and clashes, shows that Bangladeshis still want to participate. People are still organising. People are still arguing about policy and reform. People still want to vote.
Hope, in this moment, is not naïve optimism. It is practical. It is about whether Bangladesh can turn the energy of competition into a peaceful transfer of power.
Here are a few realistic ways that hope can become more than a slogan.
Civil society can widen election monitoring beyond the capitals
Election violence is often most intense in local power centres where national media attention is weaker. Citizen groups, journalists, and community leaders can focus on documenting intimidation early, not only reacting after someone dies. Al Jazeera’s mention of monitoring efforts like the Bangladesh Peace Observatory shows why systematic tracking matters.
Parties can treat discipline as a campaign strategy, not a moral lecture
If parties publicly commit to removing or suspending activists linked to violence, and if they do it consistently, they can reduce the pressure to retaliate. Internal violence, like threats linked to rebel candidates, is still violence, and it still poisons democracy.
Security can be visible without being partisan
Bangladesh’s security deployment is huge. The most important thing is not only numbers, but behaviour. Neutrality is built through small choices: equal enforcement, clear rules at polling centres, and transparent communication about arrests and investigations. Al Jazeera’s reporting suggests authorities understand the weapons problem and the limits of policing, but public trust will come from outcomes, not statements.
Reform can be connected to daily life, not only constitutional theory
The referendum on a national charter and reforms could be a turning point if voters see how it affects corruption, money politics, and the concentration of power. The AP notes proposals like term limits and checks and balances, which speak directly to fears of authoritarian drift.
Ordinary voters can reject the idea that violence is inevitable
Al Jazeera quotes a party organiser saying violence can feel inevitable during elections. That belief is understandable, but it is also dangerous because it normalises brutality. When communities refuse to shelter violent actors, refuse to spread rumours, and refuse to treat intimidation as “just politics,” the space for violence shrinks.
Bangladesh’s 2026 election is taking place in a country that has been through upheaval, grief, and enormous political tension. But it is also taking place in a country where millions of people still care enough to fight for the basic dignity of choosing their leaders.
Fear is real. So is hope.
And the outcome will not be decided only by who wins seats. It will be decided by whether Bangladesh proves that competitive politics can exist without blood on the streets.
Disclaimer
This blog post is based on a news report published by Al Jazeera and is written for general information and commentary purposes only. It is not intended to be legal, political, or professional advice, and it should not be relied upon as such. While I have aimed to summarise the source material accurately and present broader context responsibly, political situations can change quickly and some details may evolve after publication. Any views expressed are my own interpretations of the reporting, and all individuals, organisations, and events mentioned remain the responsibility of their respective sources. Readers are encouraged to consult multiple reputable news outlets and primary documents for the most up-to-date information and to form their own conclusions.